Some Issues of Political Economics of Multinational Corporations
The existence of multinational corporations is not self-evident. These corporations have costs linked with business in foreign countries compared to their domestic competitors. Therefore, in the long term, they must have particular advantages over domestic firms. These advantages are external to the market system, and in order to make them exist, a governmental activity is necessary. The government, through its intervention on the market, increases transaction costs of using the market mechanism, and through this, it also increases the influence of multinational corporations. Today, the issue is the influence of active external macroeconomic policy and the policy towards investors which uses incentives for them. The bargaining between governments and MNCs has conformed more to the market rules. However, at the same time, it has also become more institutionalised and still remains in the mercantilistic tradition.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 2010 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: nam. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3|
Phone: (02) 24 09 51 11
Fax: (02) 24 22 06 57
Web page: http://www.vse.cz/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Redakce Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3|
Web: http://www.vse.cz/aop/ Email:
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kevin H. O'Rourke & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2000.
"When Did Globalization Begin?,"
NBER Working Papers
7632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin Feldstein, 1994. "Taxes, Leverage and the National Return on Outbound Foreign Direct Investment," NBER Working Papers 4689, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bruce A. Blonigen & Matthew J. Slaughter, 2001.
"Foreign-Affiliate Activity And U.S. Skill Upgrading,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 83(2), pages 362-376, May.
- Bruce A. Blonigen & Matthew J. Slaughter, 1999. "Foreign-Affiliate Activity and U.S. Skill Upgrading," NBER Working Papers 7040, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Coase, R H, 1988. "The Nature of the Firm: Meaning," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 19-32, Spring.
- Coase, R H, 1988. "The Nature of the Firm: Influence," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 33-47, Spring.
- James R. Markusen, 1997. "Trade versus Investment Liberalization," NBER Working Papers 6231, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Coase, R H, 1988. "The Nature of the Firm: Origin," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 3-17, Spring.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prg:jnlaop:v:2010:y:2010:i:4:id:311:p:32-43. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Frantisek Sokolovsky)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.