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The impact of China’s employee basic medical insurance outpatient pooling scheme on outpatient healthcare utilization among middle-aged adults

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Listed:
  • Xinjuan Zhou
  • Xinrui Li
  • Haiyi Chen
  • Jing Deng

Abstract

Background: This study evaluates the association between China’s Employees’ Basic Medical Insurance (EBMI) outpatient pooling policy and outpatient service utilization among middle-aged insured individuals (aged 45–60). By analyzing outpatient service use, visit frequency, and out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditures, the study documents utilization patterns associated with the policy and explores their implications for healthcare-seeking behavior among middle-aged enrollees, providing evidence that may inform future adjustments to outpatient coverage design. Methods: Using cross-sectional data from the 2018 wave of the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), this study employed a logistic regression model to examine the effect of the outpatient pooling policy and different levels of outpatient benefit coverage on the probability of outpatient visits. A zero-inflated negative binomial regression model was used to analyze the impact on the frequency of outpatient visits, and a Tobit model was applied to assess its effect on out-of-pocket outpatient expenditures. Although the analysis relies on 2018 pilot data, the core institutional mechanisms of outpatient pooling were retained in the post-2021 national framework, suggesting that behavioral responses observed in pilot regions may still be informative under the current reform framework. Results: Implementation of the outpatient pooling policy was associated with a 5.0 percentage points higher probability of outpatient visits (p

Suggested Citation

  • Xinjuan Zhou & Xinrui Li & Haiyi Chen & Jing Deng, 2026. "The impact of China’s employee basic medical insurance outpatient pooling scheme on outpatient healthcare utilization among middle-aged adults," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 21(5), pages 1-17, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0350183
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0350183
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    References listed on IDEAS

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