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Large and small financial incentives may motivate COVID-19 vaccination: A randomized, controlled survey experiment

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  • Jessica Fishman
  • David S Mandell
  • Mandy K Salmon
  • Molly Candon

Abstract

Introduction: Experts continue to debate how to increase COVID-19 vaccination rates. Some experts advocate for financial incentives. Others argue that financial incentives, especially large ones, will have counterproductive psychological effects, reducing the percent of people who want to vaccinate. Among a racially and ethnically diverse U.S. sample of lower income adults, for whom vaccine uptake has lagged compared with higher income adults, we empirically examine such claims about relatively large and small guaranteed cash payments. Methods: In 2021, we conducted a randomized, controlled experiment among U.S. residents with incomes below $80,000 who reported being unvaccinated against COVID-19. Study participants were randomized to one of four study arms. In two arms, respondents first learned about a policy proposal to pay $1,000 or $200 to those who received COVID-19 vaccination and were then asked if, given that policy, they would want to vaccinate. In the two other arms, respondents received either an educational message about this vaccine or received no vaccine information and were then asked if they wanted to vaccinate for COVID-19. The primary analyses estimated and compared the overall percentage in each study arm that reported wanting to vaccinate for COVID-19. In other analyses, we estimated and compared these percentages for subgroups of interest, including gender, race/ethnicity, and education. Main results: Among 2,290 unvaccinated adults, 79.7% (95%CI, 76.4–83.0%) of those who learned about the proposed $1,000 payment wanted to get vaccinated, compared with 58.9% (95%CI, 54.8–63.0%) in the control condition without vaccine information, a difference of 20 percentage points. Among those who learned of the proposed $200 payment, 74.8% (95% CI, 71.3–78.4%) wanted to vaccinate. Among those who learned only about the safety and efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines, 68.9% (95% CI, 65.1–72.7%) wanted to vaccinate. Findings were consistent across various subgroups. Discussion: Despite several study limitations, the results do not support concerns that the financial incentive policies aimed to increase COVID-19 vaccination would have counterproductive effects. Instead, those who learned about a policy with a large or small financial incentive were more likely than those in the control condition to report that they would want to vaccinate. The positive effects extended to subgroups that have been less likely to vaccinate, including younger adults, those with less education, and racial and ethnic minorities. Financial incentives of $1,000 performed similarly to those offering only $200.

Suggested Citation

  • Jessica Fishman & David S Mandell & Mandy K Salmon & Molly Candon, 2023. "Large and small financial incentives may motivate COVID-19 vaccination: A randomized, controlled survey experiment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 18(3), pages 1-14, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0282518
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0282518
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    References listed on IDEAS

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