IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/plo/pone00/0280326.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cascades in capacity constrained agents

Author

Listed:
  • Jacob Derechin

Abstract

Many sorts of contagious phenomenon, such as music, do not exist in isolation but as part of a competitive marketplace. In these settings there are often superstars with out-sized popularity along with a large number of flops with little popularity. It could be the case that superstars are more popular because they are higher quality but I suggest that capacity constraints may be a structural factor that influences these disparities. In this agent-based model, there are multiple potentially cascading states that the agent can potentially occupy. The agents have a certain capacity of states that they can occupy at once. For example, suppose someone has a workout playlist that lasts 1 hour. As they discover new music to add to the playlist, they have to remove songs currently in the playlist to keep the playlist 1 hour. Thus, in this setting, the states indirectly trade off with each other by virtue of the capacity constraint. The key question is whether the indirect trade offs imposed by the capacity constraint are enough to induce disparities in popularity, even when the states are otherwise identical. I find that increasing the number of states in excess of capacity increases the disparities between popular and unpopular states. This suggests that capacity constraints may be a structural factor in explaining market concentration and superstar phenomenon.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacob Derechin, 2023. "Cascades in capacity constrained agents," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 18(1), pages 1-12, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0280326
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0280326
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0280326
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0280326&type=printable
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1371/journal.pone.0280326?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:plo:pone00:0003955 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
    3. Anderson, Simon P. & Engers, Maxim, 1992. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly equilibrium," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 127-135, March.
    4. Frank M. Bass, 1969. "A New Product Growth for Model Consumer Durables," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(5), pages 215-227, January.
    5. Norman Braun, 1995. "Individual Thresholds and Social Diffusion," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(2), pages 167-182, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tesoriere, Antonio, 2008. "Endogenous timing with infinitely many firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1381-1388, November.
    2. Attila Tasnádi, 2010. "Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 99(3), pages 251-266, April.
    3. Guth, Werner & Muller, Wieland & Potters, Jan, 2006. "Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 126-131, October.
    4. Ludovic Julien, 2011. "A note on Stackelberg competition," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(2), pages 171-187, June.
    5. Amir, Rabah & Stepanova, Anna, 2006. "Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-20, April.
    6. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1999. "Quantity-setting oligopoly with endogenous sequencing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 289-296, February.
    7. Amir, Rabah & Grilo, Isabel, 1999. "Stackelberg versus Cournot Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, January.
    8. Skarzhinskaya, E. & Tsurikov, V., 2021. "Endogenous Stackelberg leadership within a team. The coalition effect," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 49(1), pages 53-79.
    9. Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2009. "Simultaneous vs. sequential price competition with incomplete information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 23-26, July.
    10. Skarzhinskaya, E. & Tzurikov, V., 2023. "The endogenous formation of leadership in collective actions using the modified timing decisions algorithm," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 51-68.
    11. TESORIERE, Antonio, 2006. "Endogenous timing with free entry," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2006093, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    12. Oscar Gutiérrez & Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda, 2011. "Real options with unknown-date events," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 171-198, May.
    13. Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz & F. Javier Casado-Izaga, 2005. "Spatial competition and the duration of managerial incentive contracts," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 331-349, May.
    14. Shari, Babajide Epe & Dioha, Michael O. & Abraham-Dukuma, Magnus C. & Sobanke, Victor O. & Emodi, Nnaemeka V., 2022. "Clean cooking energy transition in Nigeria: Policy implications for Developing countries," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 319-343.
    15. Matsui, Kenji, 2020. "Optimal bargaining timing of a wholesale price for a manufacturer with a retailer in a dual-channel supply chain," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 287(1), pages 225-236.
    16. Ciwei Dong & Liu Yang & Chi To Ng, 2020. "Quantity Leadership for a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Retail Service," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 37(02), pages 1-32, March.
    17. Corrado Benassi & Alessandra Chirco & Caterina Colombo, 2021. "Efficiency of bilateral delegation in a mixed Cournot duopoly," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(3), pages 493-508, July.
    18. van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1999. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 105-129, July.
    19. Cambier, Adrien & Chardy, Matthieu & Figueiredo, Rosa & Ouorou, Adam & Poss, Michael, 2022. "Optimizing subscriber migrations for a telecommunication operator in uncertain context," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 298(1), pages 308-321.
    20. Tiruwork B. Tibebu & Eric Hittinger & Qing Miao & Eric Williams, 2024. "Adoption Model Choice Affects the Optimal Subsidy for Residential Solar," Energies, MDPI, vol. 17(3), pages 1-19, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0280326. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: plosone (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.