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The effect of temporary parental benefit on children’s antibiotics use: Evidence from a natural field experiment

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  • Linnea Wickström Östervall
  • Annika Hahlin
  • Astrid Lundevall

Abstract

Prudent use of antibiotics is important to delay the spread of resistance. This paper analyses the effect on children’s antibiotics use of a reform of the temporary parental benefit in Sweden. The reform increased the maximum compensation for this benefit. The level of compensation for social security may affect the propensity of a patient or parent to push for a prescription for antibiotics, as a less generous compensation makes it more expensive to be absent from work and since there is widespread overconfidence in the effectiveness of antibiotics. Using municipality level data, we show that the reform resulted in a reduction in children’s antibiotics use by about five per cent. The result is fairly robust to alternative empirical strategies, suggesting that welfare policies can have important indirect effects that should be taken into account.

Suggested Citation

  • Linnea Wickström Östervall & Annika Hahlin & Astrid Lundevall, 2019. "The effect of temporary parental benefit on children’s antibiotics use: Evidence from a natural field experiment," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 10(1).
    • Handle: RePEc:pia:review:v:10:y:2019:i:1:n:2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Johansson, Per & Palme, Marten, 2005. "Moral hazard and sickness insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1879-1890, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    antibiotics use; social security; temporary parental leave; natural experiment; resistance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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