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Evaluacion Del Sistema Publico De Intermediacion Laboral Y De Su Oportunidad De Privatizacion

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  • MARCOS SINGER

    () (Escuela de Administración, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

Abstract

One of the main causes of the unemployment in low-qualification socioeconomic sectors is the problem of asymmetry of information: firms ignore the true predisposition of the candidates to commit with the job, and facing such uncertainty, they deter from contracting personnel. Using an optimization model, based on the revelation principle for games of incomplete information, we deduce that the public system should offer to those candidates willing to commit salaries too high in order to distinguish them from other candidates. That is why the public system only offers low-commitment transitory jobs, leaving out of the intermediation system the unemployed people with the highest potential. As an alternative, we propose to implement a mixed public-private system, in which the public agencies would specialize on transitory jobs, and the private agencies on higher commitment jobs. In such a case, the salaries for the latter jobs would be realistic, so people with a high potential would participate in the intermediation system.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcos Singer, 2005. "Evaluacion Del Sistema Publico De Intermediacion Laboral Y De Su Oportunidad De Privatizacion," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 8(2), pages 37-58.
  • Handle: RePEc:pch:abante:v:8:y:2005:i:2:p:37-58
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oliver Bruttel, 2005. "Are Employment Zones Successful? Evidence From the First Four Years," Local Economy, London South Bank University, vol. 20(4), pages 389-403, November.
    2. Bruttel, Oliver, 2005. "Contracting-out and governance mechanisms in the public employment service," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Labor Market Policy and Employment SP I 2005-109, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    3. Lindeboom, Maarten & van Ours, Jan C & Renes, Gusta, 1994. "Matching Employers and Workers: An Empirical Analysis on the Effectiveness of Search," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 45-67, January.
    4. Kubler, Dorothea, 1999. "Coexistence of Public and Private Job Agencies: Screening with Heterogeneous Institutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 101(1-2), pages 85-107, October.
    5. Spence, Michael, 1974. "Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 296-332, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Job intermediation; revelation principle; state modernization; Chile;

    JEL classification:

    • J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

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