Una Introduccion A La Teoria Y La Practica De Las Subastas
While auctions gain relevance as a trading mechanism, different events show how unskilled many firms and governments are when using them. The objective of this article is to familiarize the reader with the auction theory, either to improve the auction design, if he is the auctioneer, or to orient the bidding strategy, if he is the bidder. First, we present the simplest auctions, using intuitive mathematical tools. Then, we consider more realistic setups, such as the existence of risk aversion, and the use of reservation prices. We also study the case where the goods auctioned can be later traded on the market, and those auctions where bidders can benefit from economies of complementarities if they are granted with specific bundles of goods. In both cases, the auctioneer must recognize the risks and opportunities, in order to maximize the economic value of the allocation of goods.
Volume (Year): 5 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002.
"Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September.
- Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, "undated". "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721, Diciembre.
- Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521551847, Diciembre.
- Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Auctions versus Negotiations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 180-194, March.
- John O. Ledyard & Mark Olson & David Porter & Joseph A. Swanson & David P. Torma, 2002. "The First Use of a Combined-Value Auction for Transportation Services," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 32(5), pages 4-12, October.
- Ledyard, John O. & Olson, Mark & Porter, David & Swanson, Joseph A. & Torma, David P., 2000. "The First Use of a Combined Value Auction for Transportation Services," Working Papers 1093, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
- Valley, Kathleen & Thompson, Leigh & Gibbons, Robert & Bazerman, Max H., 2002. "How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 127-155, January.
- Krishna, Vijay, 2002. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780124262973. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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