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¿Premian Las Tarifas El Desempeño Del Transportista?

Author

Listed:
  • MARCOS SINGER

    (Escuela de Administración, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

  • PATRICIO DONOSO

    (Escuela de Administración, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

  • SVEN WIDDEL

    (Escuela de Administración, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

Abstract

We develop an agency model subject to moral hazard to evaluate whether delivery prices reward carriers for their performance, or arbitrarily benefit some carriers and harm others. From the model, we derive several propositions that we test on a panel data of 58 carriers that work for a shipper in Santiago, over 93 weeks. We verify that the shipper rewards the experience, fleet size and service quality provided by the carrier, but not the quality of the trucks. The carrier has incentives to visit many clients, but not to travel longer distances. We also confirm that prices are sensitive to the alternatives to the agreement between the shipper and the carrier. However, a number of carriers are over or under compensated for no apparent reason.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcos Singer & Patricio Donoso & Sven Widdel, 2007. "¿Premian Las Tarifas El Desempeño Del Transportista?," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 10(1), pages 21-55.
    • Handle: RePEc:pch:abante:v:10:y:2007:i:1:p:21-55
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    File URL: http://www.abante.cl/files/ABT/Contenidos/Vol-10-N1/Singer.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Singer, Marcos & Donoso, Patricio, 2011. "Contracting contractors," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 338-343, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Freight transportation; Agency relationship; Incentives; Chile;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation

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