Mechanisms for Corruption Suppression
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Yingyi Qian, 1994. "Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(3), pages 527-544.
- Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999.
"Corruption, extortion and evasion,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December.
- Hindriks, J. & Keen, M. & Muthoo, A., 1996. "Corruption, Extortion and Evasion," Papers 179, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
- Hindriks, J. & Keen, M. & Muthoo, A., 1998. "Corruption, Extortion and Evasion," Discussion Papers 9809, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- HINDRIKS, Jean & KEEN, Michael & MUTHOO, Abhinay, 2002. "Corruption, extortion and evasion," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1671, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Chander, Parkash & Wilde, Louis, 1992. "Corruption in tax administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 333-349, December.
- Michael Keren & David Levhari, 1983. "The Internal Organization of the Firm and the Shape of Average Costs," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 474-486, Autumn.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Saikat Datta, 1996. "On Control Losses In Hierarchies," Rationality and Society, , vol. 8(4), pages 387-412, November.
- Lahiri, Bidisha & Ali, Haider, 2022. "Inspections, informal payments and tax payments by firms," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(PA).
- Mishra, Ajit, 2002.
"Hierarchies, incentives and collusion in a model of enforcement,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 165-178, February.
- A Mishra, "undated". "Hierarchies, Incentives And Collusion In Model Of Enforcement," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 067, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
- Ajit Mishra, 2000. "Hierarchies, Incentives And Collusion In A Model Of Enforcement," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 112, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
- Ajit Mishra, 1996. "Hierarchies, Incentives And Collusion In A Model Of Enforcement," Working papers 34, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000.
"A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs,"
Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 1(2), pages 231-263, November.
- Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1998. "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 356, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999. "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," CEMA Working Papers 21, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics, revised Oct 2000.
- Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 1967, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19356, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- René Brink & Pieter Ruys, 2008.
"Technology driven organizational structure of the firm,"
Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 481-503, October.
- van den Brink, J.R. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2008. "Technology driven organizational structure of the firm," Other publications TiSEM 417827ae-0c53-4d1e-8f55-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Prat, Andrea, 1997. "Hierarchies of Processors with Endogenous Capacity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 214-222, November.
- Laszlo Goerke, 2008.
"Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion,"
Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 177-196, May.
- Laszlo Goerke, 2006. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Profit Tax Evasion," CESifo Working Paper Series 1666, CESifo.
- Kafkalas, Sifis & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Tzouvelekas, Vangelis, 2014. "Tax evasion and public expenditures on tax revenue services in an endogenous growth model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 438-453.
- Lohse, Tim & Konrad, Kai A. & Qari, Salmai, 2014. "Deception Choice and Audit Design - The Importance of Being Earnest," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100577, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Alm, James & Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & McClellan, Chandler, 2016.
"Corruption and firm tax evasion,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 146-163.
- James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Chandler McClellan, 2014. "Corruption and Firm Tax Evasion," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1422, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Chandler McClellan, 2016. "Corruption and Firm Tax Evasion," Working Papers 1624, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- Jan U. Auerbach, 2019. "Property rights enforcement with unverifiable incomes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(3), pages 701-735, October.
- Massimo G. Colombo & Marco Delmastro, 2002. "The Determinants of Organizational Change and Structural Inertia: Technological and Organizational Factors," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(4), pages 595-635, December.
- Sugata Marjit & André Seidel & Marcel Thum, 2017.
"Tax Evasion, Corruption and Tax Loopholes,"
German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 18(3), pages 283-301, August.
- Marjit Sugata & Thum Marcel & Seidel André, 2017. "Tax Evasion, Corruption and Tax Loopholes," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 283-301, August.
- Seidel, André & Marjit, Sugata, 2016. "Tax Evasion, Corruption and tax Loopholes," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145635, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Wilson, John K. & Damania, Richard, 2005. "Corruption, political competition and environmental policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 516-535, May.
- Fabio Méndez, 2009. "Combating Corruption with Bargaining Disruption," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(3), pages 438-453, September.
- Cerqueti, Roy & Coppier, Raffaella, 2011.
"Economic growth, corruption and tax evasion,"
Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 489-500.
- Cerqueti, Roy & Coppier, Raffaella, 2011. "Economic growth, corruption and tax evasion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 489-500, January.
- Roy Cerqueti & Raffaella Coppier, 2009. "Economic growth, corruption and tax evasion," Working Papers 58-2009, Macerata University, Department of Finance and Economic Sciences, revised Jan 2010.
- Damjanovic, Tatiana & Ulph, David, 2010.
"Tax progressivity, income distribution and tax non-compliance,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 594-607, May.
- Tatiana Damjanovic & David Ulph, 2009. "Tax Progressivity, Income Distribution and Tax Non-Compliance," Working Papers 0928, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
- Roy Cerqueti & Raffaella Coppier, 2016. "A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 243(1), pages 71-87, August.
- Fabio Méndez, 2014. "Can corruption foster regulatory compliance?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 189-207, January.
- Delmastro, Marco, 2002. "The determinants of the management hierarchy: evidence from Italian plants," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 119-137, January.
More about this item
Keywords
corruption; hierarchical structures; game-theoretic model;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2011:i:10:p:10-30. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alexey Tcharykov (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nearuea.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.