Mechanisms for Corruption Suppression
Government agencies and large corporations meet similar problems related to control of agents dealing with outsiders: citizens under audit of the agency or clients of the company. In such interaction there typically exists a possibility of collusion. In order to prevent it, agencies and corporations usually organize hierarchical controlling structures. The present paper considers game-theoretic models of such structures and examines a problem of their optimal organization.
Volume (Year): (2011)
Issue (Month): 10 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Yingyi Qian, 1994. "Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(3), pages 527-544.
- Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999.
"Corruption, extortion and evasion,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December.
- HINDRIKS, Jean & KEEN, Michael & MUTHOO, Abhinay, "undated". "Corruption, extortion and evasion," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1671, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Hindriks, J. & Keen, M. & Muthoo, A., 1998. "Corruption, Extortion and Evasion," Discussion Papers 9809, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- Hindriks, J. & Keen, M. & Muthoo, A., 1996. "Corruption, Extortion and Evasion," Papers 179, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
- Chander, Parkash & Wilde, Louis, 1992. "Corruption in tax administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 333-349, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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