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Mechanisms for Corruption Suppression

Author

Listed:
  • Vasin, A.

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia)

  • Nikolaev, P.

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia)

  • Urazov, A.

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

Government agencies and large corporations meet similar problems related to control of agents dealing with outsiders: citizens under audit of the agency or clients of the company. In such interaction there typically exists a possibility of collusion. In order to prevent it, agencies and corporations usually organize hierarchical controlling structures. The present paper considers game-theoretic models of such structures and examines a problem of their optimal organization.

Suggested Citation

  • Vasin, A. & Nikolaev, P. & Urazov, A., 2011. "Mechanisms for Corruption Suppression," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 10, pages 10-30.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2011:i:10:p:10-30
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yingyi Qian, 1994. "Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(3), pages 527-544.
    2. Chander, Parkash & Wilde, Louis, 1992. "Corruption in tax administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 333-349, December.
    3. Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999. "Corruption, extortion and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December.
    4. Michael Keren & David Levhari, 1983. "The Internal Organization of the Firm and the Shape of Average Costs," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 474-486, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corruption; hierarchical structures; game-theoretic model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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