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Mechanisms for Corruption Suppression

  • Vasin, A.

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia)

  • Nikolaev, P.

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia)

  • Urazov, A.

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia)

Registered author(s):

    Government agencies and large corporations meet similar problems related to control of agents dealing with outsiders: citizens under audit of the agency or clients of the company. In such interaction there typically exists a possibility of collusion. In order to prevent it, agencies and corporations usually organize hierarchical controlling structures. The present paper considers game-theoretic models of such structures and examines a problem of their optimal organization.

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    File URL: http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2011-10-10-30r.pdf
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    Article provided by New Economic Association in its journal Journal of the New Economic Association.

    Volume (Year): (2011)
    Issue (Month): 10 ()
    Pages: 10-30

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    Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2011:i:10:p:10-30
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    1. Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999. "Corruption, extortion and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December.
    2. Qian, Yingyi, 1994. "Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 527-44, July.
    3. Chander, Parkash & Wilde, Louis, 1992. "Corruption in tax administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 333-349, December.
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