The Trade-Off between Risk and Control in Corporate Ownership
This paper analyses the risk-control trade-off in corporate ownership. It presents a simple model in which large shareholders decide their share depending on their risk aversion, risk-neutral effects attached to firm size, and the effectiveness of different (external and internal) mechanisms for controlling managers' behaviour. Two institutional settings in which the expected benefits from control appear to overcome risk aspects are explored: the U.S. at the turn of the twentieth century and Spain in the 1990s. The empirical evidence seems to support the predictions of the model regarding the relationship between ownership concentration, the characteristics of governance, and the size of the firm.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 160 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.mohr.de/jite|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200406)160:2_252:ttbrac_2.0.tx_2-x. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.