Strategic Commitment and International Mixed Competition with Domestic State-owned and Foreign Labor-managed Firms
This paper examines an international mixed model in which a domestic state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm competes against a foreign labor-managed income-per-worker-maximizing private firm. In the first stage, each firm independently decides whether or not to make a commitment to capacity. This capacity may subsequently be increased, but cannot be reduced. Hence, the firm's capacity cost is sunk and changes from a variable cost to a fixed cost. In the second stage, each firm independently chooses its actual output. The paper shows the equilibrium of the international mixed model.
Volume (Year): 64 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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