The Impact of Governance Quality on Economic Growth
The rise and decline of nations throughout history continuously puzzles economists. Experience shows that successful economic performance is a very complex process, the scope of which goes well beyond the simplified neoclassical approach to growth. Business environment is a key determinant of successful performance of firms. Firms can not grow, will not invest, employ, buy new technology, and develop new technology unless the business environment is good. It consists of numerous aspects of the institutional environment in an economy: the rule of law, property rights protection, capital and financial market development, labor market institutions, international relations, the role of the state, presence of corruption etc. The key institution that often manages – or at least influences – the development of all other institutions is the state. Therefore, an efficient state is crucial for successful economic performance.
Volume (Year): 2 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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