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Patent pool analysis based on technical standards: A case study of indigenous alliances in China

Author

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  • DUAN Yuzhen

    (School of Public Affairs,University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China)

  • SONG Wei

    (School of Public Affairs,University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China)

  • PENG Xiaobao

    (School of Public Affairs,University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China)

  • ZHOU Haibin

    (School of Public Affairs,University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China,Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang, China)

  • LEI lei

    (School of Public Affairs,University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China,Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang, China)

Abstract

China has set up only two sorts of patent pools (PLs) with technical standards, namely, the AVS alliance and IGRS alliance. Both PLs are applied in the IT industry. Statistics of patent alliances with global technical standards show that Chinese enterprises cannot easily form and develop an international PL. This study analyzes the formation process of the AVS and IGRS patent alliance, and points out the challenges in building and developing Chinese PL. The study offers suggestions on alliance management, government guidance, and international cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • DUAN Yuzhen & SONG Wei & PENG Xiaobao & ZHOU Haibin & LEI lei, 2013. "Patent pool analysis based on technical standards: A case study of indigenous alliances in China," International Journal of Business and Social Research, LAR Center Press, vol. 3(2), pages 7-24, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:lrc:larijb:v:3:y:2013:i:2:p:7-24
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    References listed on IDEAS

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