Are both dimensions of property rights "efficient"?
The "efficient institutions view" on property rights claims that property rights emerged and are enforced when their enforcement maximizes net wealth. In a cross-country pattern this is usually understood as the prediction that economic development creates the incentives to provide higher quality property rights, but this claim is highly debated. This paper tries to take various property rights scholars’ arguments seriously and see property rights quality as a two dimensional concept, the two dimensions being the definition and the assignment of property rights. The paper derives a measure for these two dimensions of property rights and shows that it is the assignment dimension which is determined by development, while the definition dimensions is rather determined by cultural factors, especially those deeper factors that seem to reflect a long-run effect of Western European culture. According to the paper, the main reasons behind this may be the difference in the expropriability of income generated by an improvement of each dimension, and the way such improvements may or may not affect countries' catching up process.
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Volume (Year): 12 (2015)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 41-69
| Handle: | RePEc:liu:liucej:v:12:y:2015:i:1:p:41-69 |
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Robert C. Feenstra & Robert Inklaar & Marcel P. Timmer, 2015.
"The Next Generation of the Penn World Table,"
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- Alchian, Armen A. & Demsetz, Harold, 1973. "The Property Right Paradigm," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(01), pages 16-27, March.
- Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2003. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2028, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Alesina, Alberto & La Ferrara, Eliana, 2005. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance," Scholarly Articles 4553005, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2004. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance," Development Working Papers 193, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
- Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2004. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance," NBER Working Papers 10313, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Allen, Douglas W., 2015. "On Hodgson on property rights," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(04), pages 711-717, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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