Tests for relative performance evaluation based on assumptions derived from proxy statement disclosures
No abstract is available for this item.
Volume (Year): 37 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://springerlink.metapress.com/link.asp?id=102990|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Shivaram Rajgopal & Terry Shevlin & Valentina Zamora, 2006. "CEOs' Outside Employment Opportunities and the Lack of Relative Performance Evaluation in Compensation Contracts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(4), pages 1813-1844, 08.
- Gibbons, R. & Murphy, K.J., 1989.
"Relative Performance Evaluation For Chief Executive Officers,"
532, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 30-51, February.
- Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1991. "Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers," NBER Working Papers 2944, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert Gibbons & Kevin Murphy, 1989. "Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers," Working Papers 628, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Smith, C.W. & Watts, R.L., 1992.
"The Investment Oppotunity set and Corporate Financing, Dividend and Compensation Policies,"
92-02, Rochester, Business - Financial Research and Policy Studies.
- Smith, Clifford Jr. & Watts, Ross L., 1992. "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 263-292, December.
- Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990.
"Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April.
- Paul Oyer, 2004.
"Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1619-1650, 08.
- Oyer, Paul, 2001. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?," Research Papers 1686, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Paul Oyer, 2000. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives that Have No Incentive Effects?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1440, Econometric Society.
- White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-38, May.
- Gerald Garvey & Todd Milbourn, 2003. "Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1557-1582, 08.
- Gaver, Jennifer J. & Gaver, Kenneth M., 1993. "Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 125-160, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:37:y:2011:i:2:p:127-148. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.