IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Does Buyer Experience Pay Off? Evidence from eBay

  • Genti Kostandini


  • Elton Mykerezi


  • Eftila Tanellari


  • Nour Dib


No abstract is available for this item.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 39 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 253-265

in new window

Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:39:y:2011:i:3:p:253-265
Contact details of provider: Web page:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. David Lucking-Reiley & Doug Bryan & Naghi Prasad & Daniel Reeves, 2007. "PENNIES FROM EBAY: THE DETERMINANTS OF PRICE IN ONLINE AUCTIONS -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 223-233, 06.
  2. Kagel, John H., 1995. "Cross-game learning: Experimental evidence from first-price and English common value auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 163-170, August.
  3. Werner G¸th & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Manfred K–nigstein & Martin Strobel, 2003. "Learning to bid - an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(487), pages 477-494, 04.
  4. Jeffrey Ely & Tanjim Hossain, 2006. "Sniping and squatting in auction markets," Natural Field Experiments 00274, The Field Experiments Website.
  5. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2000. "Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1927, Econometric Society.
  6. Ladislav Wintr, 2008. "Some Evidence On Late Bidding In Ebay Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(3), pages 369-379, 07.
  7. Cynthia G. McDonald & V. Carlos Slawson, 2002. "Reputation in An Internet Auction Market," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(4), pages 633-650, October.
  8. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
  9. Livingston, 2010. "The Behavior Of Inexperienced Bidders In Internet Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(2), pages 237-253, 04.
  10. Sanjeev Dewan & Vernon Hsu, 2004. "Adverse Selection In Electronic Markets: Evidence From Online Stamp Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 497-516, December.
  11. Thomas Andrews & Cynthia Benzing, 2007. "The Determinants of Price in Internet Auctions of Used Cars," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 35(1), pages 43-57, March.
  12. MINGLI ZHENG & Robert McMillan & SAJID ANWAR, 2005. "Bidding Behavior in Competing Auctions: Evidence from eBay," Microeconomics 0505001, EconWPA.
  13. Jeffrey A. Livingston, 2005. "How Valuable Is a Good Reputation? A Sample Selection Model of Internet Auctions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 453-465, August.
  14. Stanley Reynolds & John Wooders, 2009. "Auctions with a buy price," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 9-39, January.
  15. Rodney Garratt & Mark Walker & John Wooders, 2012. "Behavior in second-price auctions by highly experienced eBay buyers and sellers," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 44-57, March.
  16. Daniel Houser & John Wooders, 2006. "Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 353-369, 06.
  17. E. Elisabet RutstrÃm, 1998. "Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 427-441.
  18. Mikhail I. Melnik & James Alm, 2005. "Seller Reputation, Information Signals, and Prices for Heterogeneous Coins on eBay," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 305–328, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:39:y:2011:i:3:p:253-265. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

or (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.