IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/regeco/v27y2005i2p177-202.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How to Turn an Industry Green: Taxes versus Subsidies

Author

Listed:
  • Susanne Dröge

    ()

  • Philipp Schröder

    ()

Abstract

Environmental policies frequently target the ratio of dirty to green output within the same industry. To achieve such targets, the green sector may be subsidized or the dirty sector be taxed. We show that in a monopolistic competition setting, the two policy approaches have different welfare effects, depending on the design of the instrument (ad valorem versus unit instrument) and the initial situation (size of the dirty sector). For a strong green policy (a severe reduction of the dirty sector) a tax is the dominant instrument. If initially the dirty sector is important, then for moderate policy targets a subsidy may be the superior tool. These findings have implications for policies such as the Californian Zero Emission Bill. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Susanne Dröge & Philipp Schröder, 2005. "How to Turn an Industry Green: Taxes versus Subsidies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 177-202, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:27:y:2005:i:2:p:177-202
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-004-5343-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11149-004-5343-7
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Delipalla, Sofia & Keen, Michael, 1992. "The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 351-367, December.
    2. Conrad, Klaus & Wang, Jianmin, 1993. "The effect of emission taxes and abatement subsidies on market structure," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 499-518.
    3. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308, June.
    4. Buchanan, James M, 1969. "External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 174-177, March.
    5. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249, March.
    6. Alexander Haupt, 2000. "Environmental Product Standards, International Trade and Monopolistic Competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 7(4), pages 585-608, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Hongwei & Zheng, Shilin & Zhang, Yanhua & Zhang, Kai, 2016. "Analysis of the policy effects of downstream Feed-In Tariff on China’s solar photovoltaic industry," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 479-488.
    2. Shizuka Nishikawa, 2015. "Regulating Cournot Oligopoly with Environmental Externalities," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 43(4), pages 449-462, December.
    3. Susanne Dröge & Philipp J. H. Schröder, 2005. "Corrective Ad Valorem and Unit Taxes: A Welfare Comparison," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 534, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    environmental regulation; monopolistic competition; taxes; subsidies; welfare; Zero Emission Bill;

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:27:y:2005:i:2:p:177-202. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.