Price-matching guarantees in dual channels

Many retailers offer price-matching guarantees (PMGs) whereby they promise their customers that any lower price offered by competition for an identical product will be matched. Suppliers sometimes also offer PMGs to consumers in their direct channels. However, the extant literature on PMGs focuses on retailers and is silent on the role of upper stream chain members. We contribute to the literature by identifying the implications of PMGs in a dual distribution channel in which a supplier reaches consumers via a direct channel in addition to the retail channel. We show that the presence of PMGs in a dual channel hinges on supplier’s strategic ability, or lack thereof, to adjust its wholesale price in relation to the guarantee. Specifically, a PMG fails to prevail at equilibrium when the supplier is capable of strategically adjusting its wholesale price - but may prevail at equilibrium otherwise. The main reason is that the supplier can manage the competition between the retail channel and the direct channel through its wholesale price decision, and offering a PMG limits this ability. On the other hand, offering a PMG can be a beneficial strategy for the supplier when the supplier cannot adjust its wholesale price; for instance in a retail dominant chain where the retailer dictates the transfer price. In a retail dominant chain, if the direct and retail channels are perceived to be similar in quality and service offerings, then both channel members benefit from offering a PMG because it softens the intensity of price competition. On the other hand, when the two channels are sufficiently differentiated in quality and service offerings, then retail managers should be cautious and avoid offering the guarantee if their channel is in a superior position in terms of perceived quality.