Price Mathing Guarantees and Consumer Search
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsSequential Search; Price Matching Guarantees; Welfare Analysis;
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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