Working or shirking? Expenses and attendance in the UK Parliament
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Valentino Larcinese, 2009.
"Information Acquisition, Ideology and Turnout: Theory and Evidence From Britain,"
Journal of Theoretical Politics,
, vol. 21(2), pages 237-276, April.
- Larcinese, Valentino, 2006. "Information acquisition, ideology and turnout: theory and evidence from Britain," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3606, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Valentino Larcinese, 2006. "Information Acquisition, Ideology and Turnout:Theory and Evidence from Britain," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 18, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- John Lott & W. Reed, 1989. "Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 75-96, April.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Geys, Benny & Mause, Karsten, 2011. "Moonlighting politicians: A survey and research agenda," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-101, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Arnold, Felix & Kauder, Björn & Potrafke, Niklas, 2014.
"Outside earnings, absence, and activity: Evidence from German parliamentarians,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 147-157.
- Felix Arnold & Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke, 2014. "Outside Earnings, Absence, and Activity: Evidence from Germany Parliamentarians," CESifo Working Paper Series 4900, CESifo Group Munich.
- Bernecker, Andreas, 2014. "Do politicians shirk when reelection is certain? Evidence from the German parliament," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 55-70.
- Felix Arnold, 2013. "German MPs' Outside Jobs and Their Repercussions on Parliamentary Effort," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1340, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Leif Helland & Jon Hovi & Lars Monkerud, 2012. "Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence," European Journal of Government and Economics, Europa Grande, vol. 1(2), pages 106-125, December.
- Bernecker, Andreas, 2013. "Do Politicians Shirk when Reelection Is Certain? Evidence from the German Parliament," Working Papers 13-09, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
- Larcinese, Valentino & Sircar, Indraneel, 2017.
"Crime and punishment the British way: Accountability channels following the MPs’ expenses scandal,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 75-99.
- Valentino Larcinese & Indraneel Sircar, 2014. "Crime and Punishment the British way: Accountability Channels Following the MPs’ Expenses Scandal," Working Papers 517, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- repec:egr:ejge00:v:1:i:1:p:106-125 is not listed on IDEAS
- Thomas Braendle, 2015. "Does remuneration affect the discipline and the selection of politicians? Evidence from pay harmonization in the European Parliament," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 1-24, January.
More about this item
KeywordsLegislatures; Consituency service; Quality of politicians; Costs of democracy; Westminster; British politics;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:146:y:2011:i:3:p:291-317. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .