Save the poor, shoot some bankers
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More about this item
KeywordsAid; Principal-agent; Asymmetric information; Intrinsic motivation; Public choice; F35; O19;
- F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
- O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
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