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The optimal jury size when jury deliberation follows a random walk

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  • Eric Helland
  • Yaron Raviv

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Eric Helland & Yaron Raviv, 2008. "The optimal jury size when jury deliberation follows a random walk," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 255-262, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:134:y:2008:i:3:p:255-262
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9222-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Guarnaschelli, Serena & McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2000. "An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 407-423, June.
    2. Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, 2003. "Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 24-44, April.
    3. Eddie Dekel & Michele Piccione, 2000. "Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 34-55, February.
    4. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bryan C. McCannon & Paul Walker, 2016. "Endogenous competence and a limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 1-18, October.
    2. Guha, Brishti, 2018. "Secret ballots and costly information gathering: The jury size problem revisited," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 58-67.
    3. Francesco Parisi & Ram Singh, 2024. "Decisiveness, Correctness and Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication," Working papers 350, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    4. Guha, Brishti, 2017. "Should Jurors Deliberate?," MPRA Paper 79876, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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