The cost of disinflation and the European Monetary System
In this paper we present empirical evidence indicating that the EMS-countries have experienced a worsening of their inflation/unemployment trade-off during 1978â€“88, which on average was more pronounced than in the rest of the OECD-area. We explain this evidence by unfavorable labor market institutions in the EMS-countries, and by the nature of the deflationary policies which these countries have followed. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990
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