The Optimal Enforcement of a Finance-Constrained Immigration Law
We extend the Bucci and Tenorio (1996) model of illegal immigration by constructing a two-country, one-good, two-factor model, and use a Cobb-Douglas production function to analyze political issues not considered in their work. We consider the case where capital is immobile between the two countries, as well as the case in which capital is mobile. Our main result is that the host country's government can, under some circumstances, optimally enforce employer sanctions in order to maximize the host country's welfare under both capital mobility and immobility. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
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- Tyler Cowen (ed.), 2000. "Economic Welfare," Books, Edward Elgar, number 1586, 6.
- Bond, Eric W. & Chen, Tain-Jy, 1987. "The welfare effects of illegal immigration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 315-328, November.
- Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 56-71, March.
- Gaytan-Fregoso, Helena & Lahiri, Sajal, 2000. "Foreign aid and illegal immigration," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 515-527, December.
- Gabriella Bucci & Rafael Tenorio, 1996. "On financing the internal enforcement of illegal immigration policies," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 65-81, February.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
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