Resistance to Trade Liberalization in Unionized Sector
This paper studies the lobbying against trade liberalization by both a firm and a union in the same industry. We find that the relationship between their political activities depends on the effect of political activity by one on the marginal effectiveness of political activity by the other. We also show that, when they are strongly risk-averse and their political activities are strategic complements, trade liberalization is likely to be successful if business is brisk, the foreign firm's production cost is high or the number of union members is small. However, when they are not strongly risk-averse, these results hold reversely. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003
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Volume (Year): 14 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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