Public-Private Cooperation in Infrastructure Development: A Principal-Agent Story of Contingent Liabilities, Fiscal Risks, and Other (Un)pleasant Surprises
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DOI: 10.1007/s11067-009-9112-0
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Cited by:
- Verweij, Stefan & Meerkerk, Ingmar van, 2020. "Do public-private partnerships perform better? A comparative analysis of costs for additional work and reasons for contract changes in Dutch transport infrastructure projects," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 430-438.
- Castillo-Manzano, José I. & Pedregal, Diego J. & Pozo-Barajas, Rafael, 2016. "An econometric evaluation of the management of large-scale transport infrastructure in Spain during the great recession: Lessons for infrastructure bubbles," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 302-313.
- Kumari, Anita & Kumar Sharma, Anil, 2017. "Infrastructure financing and development: A bibliometric review," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 49-65.
- Omid M. Rouhani & H. Oliver Gao, 2016. "Evaluating Various Road Ownership Structures and Potential Competition on an Urban Road Network," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 1019-1042, December.
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Keywords
Infrastructure financing; Public-private partnerships; Principal-agent framework; Risk classification;All these keywords.
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