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Do the contingencies of external monitoring, ownership incentives, or free cash flow explain opposing firm performance expectations?

  • Peter Wright

    ()

  • Mark Kroll

    ()

  • Ananda Mukherji

    ()

  • Michael Pettus

    ()

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10997-008-9063-8
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Management & Governance.

    Volume (Year): 13 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 3 (August)
    Pages: 215-243

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:13:y:2009:i:3:p:215-243
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102940

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    1. Holmstrom, Bengt & Ricart i Costa, Joan, 1986. "Managerial Incentives and Capital Management," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(4), pages 835-60, November.
    2. Booth, James R. & Deli, Daniel N., 1996. "Factors affecting the number of outside directorships held by CEOs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 81-104, January.
    3. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1991. "The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 20(4), Winter.
    4. Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    5. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October.
    6. Doukas, John & Switzer, Lorne, 1992. "The stock market's valuation of R&D spending and market concentration," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 95-114, May.
    7. Weitzman, Martin L, 1980. "Efficient Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 719-30, June.
    8. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
    9. McConnell, John J. & Muscarella, Chris J., 1985. "Corporate capital expenditure decisions and the market value of the firm," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 399-422, September.
    10. David Hirshleifer, 1993. "Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment Decisions," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 22(2), Summer.
    11. Lang, Larry H. P. & Stulz, ReneM. & Walkling, Ralph A., 1991. "A test of the free cash flow hypothesis*1: The case of bidder returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 315-335, October.
    12. Avery, Christopher & Chevalier, Judith A & Schaefer, Scott, 1998. "Why Do Managers Undertake Acquisitions? An Analysis of Internal and External Rewards for Acquisitiveness," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 24-43, April.
    13. Chung, Kee H. & Wright, Peter & Charoenwong, Charlie, 1998. "Investment opportunities and market reaction to capital expenditure decisions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 41-60, January.
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