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Efficient Incentive Contracts

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  • Martin L. Weitzman

Abstract

A so-called "incentive contract" is a linear payment schedule, where the buyer pays a fixed fee plus some proportion of audited project cost. That remaining proportion of project cost borne by the seller is called the "sharing ratio." A higher sharing ratio creates more incentive to reduce costs. But it also makes the agent bear more cost uncertainty, requiring as compensation a greater fixed fee. The tradeoff between incentives and risk in determining the sharing ratio of an efficient contract is the central theme of the present paper. A formula is derived that shows how the optimal sharing ratio depends on such features as uncertainty, risk aversion, and the contractor's ability to control costs. Some numerical examples are calculated from the area of defense contracting.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin L. Weitzman, 1980. "Efficient Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(4), pages 719-730.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:94:y:1980:i:4:p:719-730.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1885665
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    Cited by:

    1. Rahma Daly & Marc-Arthur Diaye & Jean-Max Koskievic, 2014. "Workers’ Risk Attitude and Financial Participation," Documents de recherche 14-03, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
    2. Fölster, Stefan, 1987. "How Effective are Government R&D Subsidies: The Empirical Evidence," Working Paper Series 187, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    3. Virgile Chassagnon & Bernard Baudry, 2016. "American versus French labor and employment law : a critical review of the analysis of employment relationship in contract economic theories," Working Papers halshs-01371870, HAL.
    4. Reynaud Benedicte, 1987. "Règles et l'incomplétude du contrat de travail dans le paradigme standard (les)," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8742, CEPREMAP.
    5. Ilya Prakhov & Victor Rudakov, 2018. "The Determinants of Faculty Pay in Russian Universities: Incentive Contracts," HSE Working papers WP BRP 47/EDU/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    6. Winston Harrington & Richard D. Morgenstern & Peter Nelson, 2000. "On the accuracy of regulatory cost estimates," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(2), pages 297-322.
    7. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    8. Peter Wright & Mark Kroll & Ananda Mukherji & Michael Pettus, 2009. "Do the contingencies of external monitoring, ownership incentives, or free cash flow explain opposing firm performance expectations?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 13(3), pages 215-243, August.
    9. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
    10. Shi Chen & Ted Klastorin & Michael R. Wagner, 2021. "Designing practical coordinating contracts in decentralized projects," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 68(2), pages 183-198, March.
    11. Qidan Hu & Ying Peng & Chunxiang Guo & Dong Cai & Peiyang Su, 2019. "Dynamic Incentive Mechanism Design for Recycling Construction and Demolition Waste under Dual Information Asymmetry," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(10), pages 1-24, May.
    12. Rajeev K. Goel, 1995. "Choosing the Sharing Rate for Incentive Contracts," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 39(2), pages 68-72, October.
    13. Sanjiv Erat & Vish Krishnan, 2012. "Managing Delegated Search Over Design Spaces," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(3), pages 606-623, March.
    14. Casey Ichniowski & Kathryn Shaw & Giovanna Prennushi, 1995. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity," NBER Working Papers 5333, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Ozdenoren, Emre & Rubanov, Oleg, 2022. "Profit Sharing and Incentives," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    16. João M. Pinto & Mário Coutinho dos Santos & Pedro Verga Matos, 2021. "Contracting Out Public Transit Services: An Incentive Performance-Based Approach," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 02, Católica Porto Business School, Universidade Católica Portuguesa.
    17. Haikun Han & Juqin Shen & Bo Liu & Han Han, 2022. "Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Large-scale Projects Based on the Reputation Effects," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(4), pages 21582440221, October.
    18. Cristina Nistor & Matthew Selove, 2020. "Pricing and Quality Provision in a Supply Relationship: A Model of Efficient Relational Contracts," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(5), pages 939-955, September.
    19. Sakuma, Akimitsu, 1982. "Imperfect Information and Contracts Between Two Firms," Hitotsubashi Journal of commerce and management, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 17(1), pages 25-41, October.
    20. Leif Sörensen & Jan Schlüter, 2021. "How do contract types and incentives influence driver behavior?−An analysis of the Kigali bus network," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 8(1), pages 1-11, December.
    21. Kerkhove, L.P. & Vanhoucke, M., 2016. "Incentive contract design for projects: The owner׳s perspective," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 93-114.

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