Infant Firm Subsidization in Industries with Dynamic Structure
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordslearning-by-doing; regulation; Markov-perfect equilibrium; linear-quadratic games; L50; L13; C73;
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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