IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jincot/v13y2013i4p503-518.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Reimbursement and Investment: Prospective Payment and For-Profit Hospitals’ Market Share

Author

Listed:
  • Seungchul Lee
  • Robert Rosenman

Abstract

This paper studies how the change from retrospective cost-based reimbursement to a prospective payment system shifted hospital investment strategies from quality-enhancing technologies to cost-saving technologies. A consequence of this change was the opportunity for for-profit hospitals to capture a larger share of the market. When all of a patient’s treatment costs are paid under a retrospective average cost-based program, not-for-profit hospitals invest only in the quality-enhancing technology. For-profit hospitals have no incentive to invest in either technology. As a result, most patients select not-for-profit hospitals and for-profit hospitals attract only those few patients who have extreme time preference. When hospitals are reimbursed prospectively, however, not-for-profit hospitals invest in both quality-improving and the cost-saving technologies, as do for-profit hospitals, although at lesser amounts. Quality and market shares are more equal under prospective payment, helping to explain the increasing market share of for-profit hospitals as prospective payment has become the norm. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Seungchul Lee & Robert Rosenman, 2013. "Reimbursement and Investment: Prospective Payment and For-Profit Hospitals’ Market Share," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 503-518, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:13:y:2013:i:4:p:503-518
    DOI: 10.1007/s10842-012-0147-4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10842-012-0147-4
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10842-012-0147-4?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Siciliani, Luigi, 2006. "Selection of treatment under prospective payment systems in the hospital sector," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 479-499, May.
    2. Gaynor, Martin & Town, Robert J., 2011. "Competition in Health Care Markets," Handbook of Health Economics, in: Mark V. Pauly & Thomas G. Mcguire & Pedro P. Barros (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 499-637, Elsevier.
    3. Kurt R. Brekke & Luigi Siciliani & Odd Rune Straume, 2011. "Hospital Competition and Quality with Regulated Prices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(2), pages 444-469, June.
    4. Marisa Miraldo, 2007. "Hospital Financing and the Development and Adoption of New Technologies," Working Papers 026cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
    5. Henry B. Hansmann, 1998. "Ownership Of The Firm," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm98, Yale School of Management.
    6. Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
    7. Sloan, Frank A, et al, 1990. "The Demise of Hospital Philanthropy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(4), pages 725-743, October.
    8. Hoerger, Thomas J., 1991. "'Profit' variability in for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 259-289, October.
    9. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 2000. "Government purchasing of health services," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 15, pages 847-890, Elsevier.
    10. Horwitz, Jill R. & Nichols, Austin, 2009. "Hospital ownership and medical services: Market mix, spillover effects, and nonprofit objectives," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 924-937, September.
    11. Herr Annika, 2011. "Quality and Welfare in a Mixed Duopoly with Regulated Prices: The Case of a Public and a Private Hospital," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 12(4), pages 422-437, December.
    12. Sloan, Frank A., 2000. "Not-for-profit ownership and hospital behavior," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 21, pages 1141-1174, Elsevier.
    13. Allen, Robin & Gertler, Paul J, 1991. "Regulation and the Provision of Quality to Heterogenous Consumers: The Case of Prospective Pricing of Medical Services," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 361-375, December.
    14. Henry B. Hansmann, 1998. "Employee Ownership Of Firms," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm96, Yale School of Management.
    15. Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 1993. "Supply-Side and Demand-Side Cost Sharing in Health Care," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 135-151, Fall.
    16. Selder, Astrid, 2005. "Physician reimbursement and technology adoption," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 907-930, September.
    17. Office of Health Economics, 2007. "The Economics of Health Care," For School 001490, Office of Health Economics.
    18. Lakdawalla, Darius & Philipson, Tomas, 2006. "The nonprofit sector and industry performance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1681-1698, September.
    19. Richard Frank & David S. Salkever, 2000. "Market Forces, Diversification of Activity, and the Mission of No t-for -Profit Hospitals," NBER Chapters, in: The Changing Hospital Industry: Comparing Not-for-Profit and For-Profit Institutions, pages 195-226, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Daniel Friesner & Robert Rosenman, 2002. "A Dynamic Property Rights Theory of the Firm," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 311-333.
    21. Weisbrod, Burton A, 1991. "The Health Care Quadrilemma: An Essay on Technological Change, Insurance, Quality of Care, and Cost Containment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 29(2), pages 523-552, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Seungchul Lee & Chune Young Chung & Hong Kee Sul & Yunjae Lee, 2017. "Determinants of Market Share of For-Profit Hospitals: An Empirical Examination," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-12, October.
    2. Modhurima Dey Amin & Syed Badruddoza & Robert Rosenman, 2018. "Quality Differentiation Under Mixed Competition in Hospital Markets," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 473-484, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Brekke, Kurt R. & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2012. "Quality competition with profit constraints," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 642-659.
    2. Levaggi, Laura & Levaggi, Rosella, 2020. "Is there scope for mixed markets in the provision of hospital care?," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 247(C).
    3. Makoto Kakinaka & Ryuta Kato, 2013. "Regulated medical fee schedule of the Japanese health care system," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 301-317, December.
    4. Besley, Timothy & Malcomson, James M., 2018. "Competition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit providers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 158-172.
    5. Hugh Gravelle & Rita Santos & Luigi Siciliani & Rosalind Goudie, 2012. "Hospital Quality Competition Under Fixed Prices," Working Papers 080cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
    6. Barigozzi, Francesca & Burani, Nadia, 2016. "Competition and screening with motivated health professionals," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 358-371.
    7. Levaggi, Rosella & Moretto, Michele & Pertile, Paolo, 2023. "Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services," FEEM Working Papers 338404, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    8. Martin Gaynor & Kate Ho & Robert J. Town, 2015. "The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(2), pages 235-284, June.
    9. Brekke, Kurt Richard & Siciliani, Luigi, 2011. "Quality competition with profit constraints: Do non-profit firms provide higher quality than for-profit firms?," CEPR Discussion Papers 8284, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2019. "Competition and equity in health care markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-14.
    11. Domenico Lisi & Luigi Siciliani & Odd Rune Straume, 2020. "Hospital competition under pay‐for‐performance: Quality, mortality, and readmissions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 289-314, April.
    12. Bardey, David & Canta, Chiara & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie, 2012. "The regulation of health care providers’ payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 691-704.
    13. Ziad R. Ghandour, 2019. "Public-Private Competition in Regulated Markets," NIPE Working Papers 02/2019, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    14. Kurt R. Brekke & Luigi Siciliani & Odd Rune Straume, 2017. "Hospital Mergers with Regulated Prices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(3), pages 597-627, July.
    15. repec:nip:nipewp:10/2014 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. James M. Malcomson, 2005. "Supplier Discretion Over Provision: Theory and an Application to Medical Care," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 412-429, Summer.
    17. Olivella, Pau & Siciliani, Luigi, 2017. "Reputational concerns with altruistic providers," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 1-13.
    18. Beitia, Arantza, 2003. "Hospital quality choice and market structure in a regulated duopoly," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 1011-1036, November.
    19. Sonja Ossig & Eberhard Feess, 2004. "The impact of liability for malpractice on the optimal reimbursement schemes for health services," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 396, Econometric Society.
    20. Jeannette Brosig‐Koch & Burkhard Hehenkamp & Johanna Kokot, 2017. "The effects of competition on medical service provision," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(S3), pages 6-20, December.
    21. Freedman, Seth & Lin, Haizhen & Simon, Kosali, 2015. "Public health insurance expansions and hospital technology adoption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 117-131.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    prospective payment system; hospital competition; technology investment; hospital quality; I11; O33; L33;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:13:y:2013:i:4:p:503-518. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.