Dynamic Incentive Contracts in Multiple Penalty Systems with No-commitment to Tenure-track Auditing
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- Polinsky, A. Mitchell, 2006.
"Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 323-335, September.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2004. "Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe," NBER Working Papers 10760, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2004. "Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe," Discussion Papers 03-038, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Arguedas, C., 2005. "Pollution Standards, Costly Monitoring and Fines," Discussion Paper 2005-9, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Avner Bar-Ilan & Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "The Response to Fines and Probability of Detection in a Series of Experiments," NBER Working Papers 8638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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