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Entry regulation and social welfare with an integer problem


  • Toshihiro Matsumura



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Suggested Citation

  • Toshihiro Matsumura, 2000. "Entry regulation and social welfare with an integer problem," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 47-58, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:71:y:2000:i:1:p:47-58
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01227496

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Kotaro Suzumura & Kazuharu Kiyono, 1987. "Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(1), pages 157-167.
    2. Lahiri, Sajal & Ono, Yoshiyasu, 1988. "Helping Minor Firms Reduces Welfare," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(393), pages 1199-1202, December.
    3. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1981. "Potential Competition May Reduce Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 184-189, May.
    4. Avner Shaked & John Sutton, 1982. "Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 3-13.
    5. Konishi, Hideki & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1990. "Oligopolistic competition and economic welfare : A general equilibrium analysis of entry regulation and tax-subsidy schemes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 67-88, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gu Yiquan & Wenzel Tobias, 2012. "Price-Dependent Demand in Spatial Models," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-26, March.
    2. Adam T. Jones, 2016. "Mileage tax, property tax, sales tax, or fee: the best way to pay for commercial infrastructure that isn’t free," Review of Regional Research: Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft, Springer;Gesellschaft für Regionalforschung (GfR), vol. 36(1), pages 81-98, February.
    3. Ming Chung Chang & Hsiao-Ping Peng, 2009. "Structure Regulation, Price Structure, Cross-Subsidization And Marginal Cost Of Public Funds," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(6), pages 675-698, December.
    4. Keisuke Hattori & Takeshi Yoshikawa, 2016. "Free entry and social inefficiency under co-opetition," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 118(2), pages 97-119, June.
    5. Gu, Yiquan & Wenzel, Tobias, 2009. "A note on the excess entry theorem in spatial models with elastic demand," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 567-571, September.
    6. Francisco Galera & Pedro Garcia-del-Barrio, 2011. "Excessive entry and the integer constraint with many firms: a note," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(3), pages 271-287, July.
    7. Gu, Yiquan & Rasch, Alexander & Wenzel, Tobias, 2014. "Price-sensitive demand and market entry," DICE Discussion Papers 165, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    8. Cato, Susumu & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2013. "Entry-License Tax: Stackelberg versus Cournot," MPRA Paper 81297, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 12 Sep 2017.
    9. repec:bpj:bejtec:v:17:y:2017:i:2:p:9:n:2 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Ikuo Ishibashi & Noriaki Matsushima, 2006. "Inviting entrants may help incumbent firms," Discussion Papers 2006-46, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
    11. repec:bla:presci:v:95:y:2016:i:4:p:865-875 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    entry regulation; excess entry; integer problem; L13; L51;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation


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