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Tax Evasion and Equity Theory: An Investigative Approach

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  • Sharmila King
  • Steven Sheffrin

Abstract

Traditional economic theory assumes rational individuals with stable preferences who, given an array of options and probabilities, maximize their expected utility. However, experimental research finds that individuals make systematic “mistakes” when attempting to maximize their expected utility. The economic psychology approach includes aspects of the traditional economic approach and the psychological approach that emphasizes values, attitudes, norms, conformity and morals. This paper investigates equity theory and tax evasion using the framework of prospect theory pioneered by Tversky and Kahneman. We design an investigation to identify if individual behavior follows the usual results of prospect theory, given a scenario that frames a perception of inequity. The investigation frames a scenario to invoke a controlled tax regime. The frame varies according to which inequity is being measured, exchange or social. Once the scenario is established, a questionnaire is designed to determine how the individual responds when filing taxes. The responses to the control questions are consistent with prospect theory. However, in general the responses to the framed questions, depicting inequity, are more consistent with expected utility theory. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Suggested Citation

  • Sharmila King & Steven Sheffrin, 2002. "Tax Evasion and Equity Theory: An Investigative Approach," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(4), pages 505-521, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:9:y:2002:i:4:p:505-521
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1016528406214
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dominika Langenmayr, 2017. "Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes—Increasing Revenue, or Increasing Incentives to Evade?," NBER Chapters, in: Personal Income Taxation and Household Behavior (TAPES), National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro & Ilde Rizzo, 2014. "Tax compliance under horizontal and vertical equity conditions: An experimental approach," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 21(4), pages 560-577, August.
    3. Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2007. "Tax evasion and social interactions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2089-2112, December.
    4. James Alm & Matthias Kasper & Erich Kirchler, 2022. "Can ethics change? Enforcement and its effects on taxpayer compliance," Working Papers 2209, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
    5. Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Antoine Malézieux & Jason Shogren, 2016. "Is tax evasion a personality trait ? An empirical evaluation of psychological determinants of "tax morale" [L'évasion fiscale est-elle un trait de personnalité ? Une évaluation empirique ," Post-Print halshs-01476519, HAL.
    6. Tan, Fangfang & Yim, Andrew, 2010. "Deterrence Effects of Auditing Rules: An Experimental Study," MPRA Paper 27859, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Frank A Cowell, 2003. "Sticks and Carrots," STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers 68, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    8. Richter, Wolfram F., 2007. "Geplante Steuerhinterziehung und ihre effiziente Bestrafung," RWI Materialien 37, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
    9. MirHadi Hosseini Kondelaji & Majid Sameti & Hadi Amiri & Rozita Moayedfar, 2016. "Analyzing Determinants of Tax Morale Based on Social Psychology Theory: Case Study of Iran," Iranian Economic Review (IER), Faculty of Economics,University of Tehran.Tehran,Iran, vol. 20(4), pages 579-595, Autumn.

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