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On the Political Economy of Low Skilled Immigration and the Welfare State

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  • Alexander Kemnitz

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Abstract

This paper inquires into the collective decision making on both unemployment insurance and immigration. It is shown that low skill immigration typically increases the contribution rate to the unemployment insurance system. This can translate into higher benefits, the increase of the economy-wide unemployment rate nonwithstanding. The host country allows for immigration only if high skilled natives are sufficiently powerful. Furthermore, political rights of immigrants are restricted to a minimum. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Kemnitz, 2002. "On the Political Economy of Low Skilled Immigration and the Welfare State," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(4), pages 423-434, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:9:y:2002:i:4:p:423-434
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1016516019418
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Kemnitz, 2006. "Immigration as a commitment device," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 299-313, June.
    2. Yuji Tamura, 2006. "Disagreement over the immigration of low-income earners in a welfare state," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(4), pages 691-702, October.
    3. Victoria Chorny & Rob Euwals & Kees Folmer, 2007. "Immigration policy and welfare state design; a qualitative approach to explore the interaction," CPB Document 153, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    4. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 2013. "Migration and Tax Competition Within a Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 9600, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 2013. "Migration and Fiscal Competition within a Union," NBER Working Papers 19282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Karin Mayr, 2007. "Immigration and income redistribution: A political economy analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 101-116, April.
    7. Tamura, Yuji, 2004. "Referendum-Led Immigration Policy In The Welfare State," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 713, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.

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    Keywords

    immigration policy; democracy; unemployment;

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