The breakdown of cooperation in iterative real-time trust dilemmas
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992.
"An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game,"
Econometric Society, pages 803-836.
- McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas., 1991. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Working Papers 732, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Richard McKelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1999. "An experimental study of the centipede game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 521, David K. Levine.
- Burnham, Terence & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L., 2000. "Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-73, September.
- Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1988. "Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 1-36, January.
- Güth, W. & Kliemt, H., 1993. "Competition or Co-Operation," Discussion Paper 1993-39, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Reny Philip J., 1993.
"Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 257-274, April.
- P. Reny, 2010. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 386, David K. Levine.
- Jim Engle-Warnick & Robert L. Slonim, 2001. "The Fragility and Robustness of Trust," Economics Papers 2001-W15, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
- Guth, Werner & Ockenfels, Peter & Wendel, Markus, 1997. "Cooperation based on trust. An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 15-43, February.
- Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Douglas D. Davis & Oleg Korenok, 2009.
"Posted Offer Markets In Near-Continuous Time: An Experimental Investigation,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(3), pages 449-466, July.
- Douglas D. Davis & Oleg Korenok, 2005. "Posted - Offer Markets In Near Continuous Time: an Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 0504, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics, revised 2007.
- Edward L. Glaeser & David I. Laibson & José A. Scheinkman & Christine L. Soutter, 2000. "Measuring Trust," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 811-846.
- Dimitri Dubois & Marc Willinger, 2007. "The role of players’ identification in the population on the trusting and the trustworthy behavior an experimental investigation," Working Papers 07-06, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2007.
- Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2011. "The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(3), pages 375-398, September.
- repec:wly:emetrp:v:85:y:2017:i::p:915-935 is not listed on IDEAS
- Philippe Gillen & Alexander Rasch & Achim Wambach & Peter Werner, 2016. "Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 511-534.
- Chen, Daniel L. & Schonger, Martin, 2016.
"A Theory of Experiments: Invariance of Equilibrium to the Strategy Method of Elicitation and Implications for Social Preferences,"
TSE Working Papers
16-724, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Chen, Daniel L. & Schonger, Martin, 2016. "A Theory of Experiments: Invariance of Equilibrium to the Strategy Method of Elicitation and Implications for Social Preferences," IAST Working Papers 16-54, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
- Zacharias Maniadis, 2008. "Essays in Aggregate Information, The Media and Special Interests," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002258, David K. Levine.
- Olivier Ledoit, 2011.
ECON - Working Papers
038, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ho Fai Chan & Bruno S. Frey & Jana Gallus & Benno Torgler, 2013. "Does The John Bates Clark Medal Boost Subsequent Productivity And Citation Success?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2013-02, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Ho Fai Chan & Bruno S. Frey & Jana Gallus & Benno Torgler, 2013. "Does the John Bates Clark Medal Boost Subsequent Productivity and Citation Success?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4419, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ho Fai Chan & Bruno S. Frey & Jana Gallus & Benno Torgler, 2013. "Does The John Bates Clark Medal Boost Subsequent Productivity And Citation Success?," QuBE Working Papers 004, QUT Business School.
- Eva M. Krockow & Briony D. Pulford & Andrew M. Colman, 2015. "Competitive Centipede Games: Zero-End Payoffs and Payoff Inequality Deter Reciprocal Cooperation," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 6(3), pages 1-11, August.
- Timothy Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2015. "Promoting cooperation in nonlinear social dilemmas through peer punishment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(1), pages 66-88, March.
More about this item
KeywordsCentipede game; Cooperation; Population dynamics; Trust; Trust dilemmas;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:9:y:2006:i:2:p:147-166. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.