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The Impact of Adaptation on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Author

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  • Michèle Breton

    (HEC Montréal)

  • Lucia Sbragia

    (Durham University Business School)

Abstract

We examine the stability of international environmental agreements that include clauses pertaining to both adaptation and mitigation measures. We assume that adaptation requires a prior irreversible investment and presents the characteristics of a private good by reducing a country’s vulnerability to the impact of pollution, while mitigation policies produce a public good by reducing the total amount of pollution. Using a stylized model, we show that adaptive measures can be used strategically and that their inclusion in environmental agreements enhances agreement stability and can even lead to full cooperation. We examine the robustness of agreements including both adaptation and mitigation measures against renegotiation. Finally, we evaluate how including adaptive measures for climate change in international environmental agreements affects welfare and overall pollution.

Suggested Citation

  • Michèle Breton & Lucia Sbragia, 2019. "The Impact of Adaptation on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(2), pages 697-725, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:74:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s10640-019-00341-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-019-00341-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Miguel Borrero & Santiago J. Rubio, 2022. "An adaptation-mitigation game: does adaptation promote participation in international environmental agreements?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 439-479, September.
    3. Gilbert Kollenbach, 2022. "International Environmental Agreements and Black Technology," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 82(3), pages 601-624, July.
    4. Chiara Donnini & Armando Sacco, 2024. "Social equity in international environmental agreements," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 90(1), pages 261-291, September.
    5. Finus, Michael & Furini, Francesco & Rohrer, Anna Viktoria, 2021. "The efficacy of international environmental agreements when adaptation matters: Nash-Cournot vs Stackelberg leadership," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    6. Rohrer, Anna Viktoria & Rubio, Santiago J., 2024. "The strategic role of adaptation in international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    7. Achim Hagen & Pierre von Mouche & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2020. "The Two-Stage Game Approach to Coalition Formation: Where We Stand and Ways to Go," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, January.
    8. Ralph Winkler, 2023. "On the Relationship between Adaptation and Mitigation," CESifo Working Paper Series 10371, CESifo.

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