Can international environmental cooperation be bought: Comment
Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2010) analytically examine the effects of the countries’ heterogeneity on the international environmental cooperation. They consider two types of countries having different abatement costs in one case and different environmental damages in another case. Furthermore it is analyzed whether a self-financed transfer system can diminish these heterogeneity effects. The paper shows for both scenarios of asymmetry and no transfers that the maximum level of cooperation consists of three countries of the same type. For the case of heterogeneity in environmental damages, Fuentes-Albero and Rubio conclude that an agreement between one type 1 and one type 2 country is also self-enforcing given that the differences in the damages are not very large. In this comment, the derivation of the last mentioned result is shown to be incorrect by proving that this coalition is not self-enforcing.
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- EYCKMANS, Johan & FINUS, Michael, 2003.
"Coalition formation in a global warming game : how the design of protocols affects the success of environmental treaty-making,"
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2003088, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2003. "Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0317, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Asheim, Geir B. & Froyn, Camilla Bretteville & Hovi, Jon & Menz, Fredric C., 2006. "Regional versus global cooperation for climate control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 93-109, January.
- Fuentes Albero Cristina & Rubio Jorge Santiago J., 2008.
"Can International Environmental Cooperation Be Bought?,"
2010101, Fundacion BBVA / BBVA Foundation.
- Fuentes-Albero, Cristina & Rubio, Santiago J., 2010. "Can international environmental cooperation be bought?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 202(1), pages 255-264, April.
- Mendelsohn, Robert & Dinar, Ariel & Williams, Larry, 2006. "The distributional impact of climate change on rich and poor countries," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(02), pages 159-178, April.
- Barrett, Scott, 2001. "International cooperation for sale," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1835-1850, December.
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