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Product Durability and Extended Producer Responsibility in Solid Waste Management

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  • Marco Runkel

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Abstract

Using a vintage durable good model, this paper investigates how extended producer responsibility (EPR) in waste management influences product durability and welfare. Four EPR instruments are discussed and compared with the benchmark in which producers do not receive price signals for waste disposal. In each case, EPR induces durability to increase. Under perfect competition the welfare change caused by EPR is unambiguously positive and one EPR instrument is even capable of implementing the first-best welfare optimum. In contrast, under imperfect competition EPR may lead to a welfare reduction. The analysis also compares EPR to non-EPR measures. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Runkel, 2003. "Product Durability and Extended Producer Responsibility in Solid Waste Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 24(2), pages 161-182, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:24:y:2003:i:2:p:161-182
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1022800206337
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Margaret Walls & Paul Calcott, 2000. "Can Downstream Waste Disposal Policies Encourage Upstream "Design for Environment"?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 233-237, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. M. Dubois & J. Eyckmans, 2015. "Efficient Waste Management Policies and Strategic Behavior with Open Borders," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 907-923, December.
    2. Pangburn, Michael S. & Stavrulaki, Euthemia, 2014. "Take back costs and product durability," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 238(1), pages 175-184.
    3. Fleckinger, Pierre & Glachant, Matthieu, 2010. "The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 57-66, January.
    4. Bernard, Sophie, 2015. "North–south trade in reusable goods: Green design meets illegal shipments of waste," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 22-35.
    5. Brice ARNAUD, 2014. "Extended Producer Responsibility and Green Marketing: an Application to Packaging," Cahiers du GREThA 2014-04, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
    6. R. Bracke & M. De Clercq, 2005. "Implementing Extended Producer Responsibility in Flemish Waste Policy: Evaluation of the Introduction of the Duty of Acceptance," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/302, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    7. repec:hal:cesptp:hal-00641867 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:kap:enreec:v:67:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10640-015-9986-x is not listed on IDEAS

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