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Product Durability and Extended Producer Responsibility in Solid Waste Management

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  • Marco Runkel

    ()

Abstract

Using a vintage durable good model, this paper investigates how extended producer responsibility (EPR) in waste management influences product durability and welfare. Four EPR instruments are discussed and compared with the benchmark in which producers do not receive price signals for waste disposal. In each case, EPR induces durability to increase. Under perfect competition the welfare change caused by EPR is unambiguously positive and one EPR instrument is even capable of implementing the first-best welfare optimum. In contrast, under imperfect competition EPR may lead to a welfare reduction. The analysis also compares EPR to non-EPR measures. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1022800206337
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Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 24 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 161-182

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Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:24:y:2003:i:2:p:161-182
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263

Keywords: extended producer responsibility; market structure; product durability; solid waste;

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Cited by:

  1. Pangburn, Michael S. & Stavrulaki, Euthemia, 2014. "Take back costs and product durability," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 238(1), pages 175-184.
  2. R. Bracke & M. De Clercq, 2005. "Implementing Extended Producer Responsibility in Flemish Waste Policy: Evaluation of the Introduction of the Duty of Acceptance," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/302, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  3. Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant, 2010. "The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00641867, HAL.
  4. Brice ARNAUD, 2014. "Extended Producer Responsibility and Green Marketing: an Application to Packaging," Cahiers du GREThA 2014-04, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.

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