The Oil Spill Process: The Effect of Coast Guard Monitoring on Oil Spills
In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of Coast Guard enforcement efforts in reducing oil spills. We consider how vessel owners’ behavior changes with increases in the probability of being monitored. We also study the effectiveness of the performance standards adopted by the Coast Guard in 1984. We conclude that: (i) Coast Guard enforcement effort works to decrease both the frequency of oil spills and the spill size, even though in this latter case the effect is smaller; (ii) the expected fine has no effect on either the frequency or size of oil spills; (iii) few spills from non-monitored transfers are detected; and (iv) the implementation of the new performance standards increases the effectiveness of the Coast Guard monitoring efforts. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997
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Volume (Year): 10 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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- Cohen, Mark A, 1987. "Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 23-51, April.
- Burrows, Paul & Rowley, Charles K. & Owen, David, 1974. "Operational dumping and the pollution of the sea by oil: An evaluation of preventive measures," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 202-218, November.
- Cohen, Mark A., 1986. "The costs and benefits of oil spill prevention and enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 167-188, June.
- White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.