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The Oil Spill Process: The Effect of Coast Guard Monitoring on Oil Spills

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  • Montserrat Grau
  • Theodore Groves

Abstract

In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of Coast Guard enforcement efforts in reducing oil spills. We consider how vessel owners’ behavior changes with increases in the probability of being monitored. We also study the effectiveness of the performance standards adopted by the Coast Guard in 1984. We conclude that: (i) Coast Guard enforcement effort works to decrease both the frequency of oil spills and the spill size, even though in this latter case the effect is smaller; (ii) the expected fine has no effect on either the frequency or size of oil spills; (iii) few spills from non-monitored transfers are detected; and (iv) the implementation of the new performance standards increases the effectiveness of the Coast Guard monitoring efforts. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

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  • Montserrat Grau & Theodore Groves, 1997. "The Oil Spill Process: The Effect of Coast Guard Monitoring on Oil Spills," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(4), pages 315-339, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:10:y:1997:i:4:p:315-339
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1018343600621
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cohen, Mark A, 1987. "Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 23-51, April.
    2. Burrows, Paul & Rowley, Charles K. & Owen, David, 1974. "Operational dumping and the pollution of the sea by oil: An evaluation of preventive measures," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 202-218, November.
    3. Cohen, Mark A., 1986. "The costs and benefits of oil spill prevention and enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 167-188, June.
    4. Epple, Dennis & Visscher, Michael, 1984. "Environmental Pollution: Modeling Occurrence, Detection, and Deterrence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 29-60, April.
    5. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. maurice moffett & alok k. bohara & kishore gawande, 2005. "Governance and Performance: Theory-Based Evidence from US Coast Guard Inspections," Public Economics 0505002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Vollaard, Ben, 2017. "Temporal displacement of environmental crime: Evidence from marine oil pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 168-180.
    3. Muehlenbachs, Lucija & Cohen, Mark A. & Gerarden, Todd, 2013. "The impact of water depth on safety and environmental performance in offshore oil and gas production," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 699-705.
    4. Muehlenbachs, Lucija & Staubli, Stefan & Cohen, Mark A., 2013. "The Effect of Inspector Group Size and Familiarity on Enforcement and Deterrence," RFF Working Paper Series dp-13-36, Resources for the Future.
    5. Kishore Gawande & Alok K. Bohara, 2005. "Agency Problems in Law Enforcement: Theory and Application to the U.S. Coast Guard," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(11), pages 1593-1609, November.
    6. Muehlenbachs, Lucija & Cohen, Mark A. & Gerarden, Todd, 2011. "Preliminary Empirical Assessment of Offshore Production Platforms in the Gulf of Mexico," RFF Working Paper Series dp-10-66, Resources for the Future.
    7. Alm, James & Shimshack, Jay, 2014. "Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from Pollution, Safety, and Tax Settings," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 10(4), pages 209-274, December.
    8. Kari Hyytiäinen & Anni Huhtala, 2014. "Combating eutrophication in coastal areas at risk for oil spills," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 219(1), pages 101-121, August.
    9. Lucija Muehlenbachs & Stefan Staubli & Mark A. Cohen, 2016. "The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 159-204.
    10. Júlia Gallego Ziero Uhr & André Luis Squarize Chagas, Daniel de Abreu Pereira Uhr, Renan Porn Peres, 2017. "A study on environmental infractions for Brazilian municipalities: a spatial dynamic panel approach," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2017_13, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).

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    Keywords

    oil spills; enforcement and monitoring;

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