Political connection and leverage: Some Malaysian evidence
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More about this item
KeywordsCapital structure; Leverage ratio; Political connection; Market-to-book ratio;
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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