Ex Ante and Ex Post Allocation of Risk of Illegality: Regulatory Sources of Contractual Failure and Issues of Corrective and Distributive Justice
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- Beales, Howard & Craswell, Richard & Salop, Steven C, 1981. "The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 491-539, December.
- Trebilcock, Michael J, 1988. "The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice of Efficient Civil Liability Rules," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 243-65, Fall.
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- Scott, Robert E, 1990. "A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 597-616, June.
- Ehrlich, Isaac, 1982. "The optimum enforcement of laws and the concept of justice: A positive analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 3-27, June.
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