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Economic impossibility in Turkish contract law from the perspective of law and economics

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  • Hüseyin Aksoy
  • Hans-Bernd Schäfer

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  • Hüseyin Aksoy & Hans-Bernd Schäfer, 2012. "Economic impossibility in Turkish contract law from the perspective of law and economics," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 105-126, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:34:y:2012:i:1:p:105-126
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-010-9170-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. Trimarchi, Pietro, 1991. "Commercial impracticability in contract law: An economic analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 63-82, May.
    3. White, Michelle J, 1988. "Contract Breach and Contract Discharge Due to Impossibility: A Unified Theory," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 353-376, June.
    4. Steven Shavell, 1980. "Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 466-490, Autumn.
    5. Gillette, Clayton P, 1990. "Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 535-581, June.
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