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Constitutional design for a rent-seeking society: Voting rule choice

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  • Z. Spindler

Abstract

If rent-seeking costs are considered in addition to, and separate from, external costs and decision costs in Buchanan and Tullock's economic theory of constitutions, total interdependence costs may have multiple local minima close to the decision-making extremes. As a result, the global minimum, which gives the optimal decision rule, may be much closer to “unanimity rule” or “individual rule” than to “simple majority rule”. Further, the comparison of the minimum total interdependence costs for the public sector with those for the private sector would only justify a smaller scope and size for the public sector than would be the case if rent-seeking costs were ignored. Finally, systematic variation in rent-seeking cost could account for dramatic regime shifts between dictatorship and democracy. Copyright George Mason University 1990

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  • Z. Spindler, 1990. "Constitutional design for a rent-seeking society: Voting rule choice," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 73-82, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:1:y:1990:i:3:p:73-82
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393241
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Z. A. Spindler, 1974. "Endogenous Bargaining Power in Bilateral Monopoly and Bilateral Exchange," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 7(3), pages 463-474, August.
    2. Richard E. Wagner, 2004. "Public Choice as an Academic Enterprise," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 55-74, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Keith Dougherty & Julian Edward & Robi Ragan, 2015. "The value of formalism: re-examining external costs and decision costs with multiple groups," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 31-52, April.
    2. Lim Wooyoung & Zhang Jipeng, 2020. "Endogenous Authority and Enforcement in Public Goods Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-22, June.
    3. Z A Spindler & X de Vanssay, 2002. "Constitutions And Economic Freedom," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 70(6), pages 1135-1147, September.
    4. Keith L. Dougherty, 2015. "Supermajority rules," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 7, pages 102-116, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Magnouloux Hervé, 1995. "Des Regles Constitutionnelles aux Preferences Ethiques : Pertinence de l' Approche Contractualiste," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2-3), pages 1-20, June.
    6. T. Durant, 2011. "Making executive politics mutually productive and fair," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 141-172, June.
    7. Keith L. Dougherty & Robi Ragan, 2016. "An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 332-353, September.
    8. Zane Spindler & Xavier De Vanssay, 2003. "Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 95-105, June.

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