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Parchment, guns, and the problem of governance

Author

Listed:
  • Giampaolo Garzarelli
  • Matthew Holian

Abstract

The genuine problem of governance is one that pays equal attention to both incentive and knowledge issues in private and public contexts. This work brings together Austrian, Public Choice and theory of the firm insights to address such problem. By taking into account incentives and knowledge, it proposes a framework that accommodates comparisons not just of kind (firm or market), but also of degree (e.g., among different types of internal organization). Moreover, although the suggested framework derives from considerations about private governance, it equally accommodates public and private settings. (89 words.) Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Giampaolo Garzarelli & Matthew Holian, 2014. "Parchment, guns, and the problem of governance," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 71-80, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:27:y:2014:i:1:p:71-80
    DOI: 10.1007/s11138-013-0230-z
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Governance; Political economy; Rent creation; Rent seeking; Theory of the firm; D20; H00; L20;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General

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