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The electoral college: diversification and the election process

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  • Chris Cain
  • Peter Basciano
  • Ellen Cain

Abstract

The basic financial principle of diversification is applied to the U.S. Presidential election process. Applying this principle shows that the current Electoral College system may offer significant advantages over a direct voting system. Calls for an abolishment of the Electoral College may be premature if the goal of the election process is to ensure accurate results. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Chris Cain & Peter Basciano & Ellen Cain, 2007. "The electoral college: diversification and the election process," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 21-34, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:18:y:2007:i:1:p:21-34
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-006-9010-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
    3. Crain, W Mark & Messenheimer, Harold C & Tollison, Robert D, 1993. "The Probability of Being President," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 75(4), pages 683-689, November.
    4. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Election; Electoral college; Constitution; Modern portfolio theory; Voting; Diversification; G0; P48;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G0 - Financial Economics - - General
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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