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A Tag-Based Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Networks with Different Topologies

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  • Jae-Woo Kim

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Abstract

Researchers from many disciplines have been interested in the maintenance of cooperation in animal and human societies using the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Recent studies highlight the roles of cognitively simple agents in the evolution of cooperation who read tags to interact either discriminately or selectively with tolerably similar partners. In our study on a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game, artificial agents with tags and tolerance perceive dissimilarities to local neighbors to cooperate with in-group and otherwise defect. They imitate tags and learn tolerance from more successful neighbors. In terms of efficiency, society-wide cooperation can evolve even when the benefits of cooperation are relatively low. Meanwhile, tolerance however decreases as agents become homogenized. In terms of stability, parochial cooperators are gullible to the deviants defectors displaying tolerably similar tags. We find that as the benefits of cooperation increase and the dimensions of tag space become larger, emergent societies can be more tolerant towards heterogeneous others. We also identify the effects of clustering and small-world-ness on the dynamics of tag-based parochial cooperation in spite of its fundamental vulnerability to those deviants regardless of network topology. We discuss the issue of tag changeability in search for alternative societies in which tag-based parochial cooperation is not only efficient but also robust.

Suggested Citation

  • Jae-Woo Kim, 2010. "A Tag-Based Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Networks with Different Topologies," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 13(3), pages 1-2.
  • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2008-76-4
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    File URL: http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/13/3/2/2.pdf
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    1. repec:spr:jeicoo:v:12:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11403-015-0155-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:eee:apmaco:v:279:y:2016:i:c:p:76-89 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Zhang, Hong, 2015. "Moderate tolerance promotes tag-mediated cooperation in spatial Prisoner’s dilemma game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 424(C), pages 52-61.

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