"I Think You Think I Think You're Lying": The Interactive Epistemology of Trust in Social Networks
We investigate the epistemology of trust in social networks. We posit trust as a special epistemic state that depends on actors' beliefs about each others' beliefs as well as about states of the world. It offers new ideas and tools for representing the core elements of trust both within dyads and larger groups and presents an approach that makes trust measurable in a noncircular and predictive, rather than merely postdictive, fashion. After advancing arguments for the importance of interactive belief systems to the successful coordination of behavior, we tune our investigation of trust by focusing on beliefs that are important to mobilization and coordination and show how trust functions to influence social capital arising from network structure. We present empirical evidence corroborating the importance of higher-order beliefs to understanding trust and the interactive analysis of trust to the likelihood of successful coordination. This paper was accepted by Jesper Sørensen, organizations and social networks.
Volume (Year): 57 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 7240 Parkway Drive, Suite 300, Hanover, MD 21076 USA|
Web page: http://www.informs.org/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014.
"Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium,"
World Scientific Book Chapters,in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-1180, September.
- Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 2000. "Communication and Coordination in Social Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 1-16.
- Adam Brandenburger, 1992. "Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 83-101, Fall.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 1997. "Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1639, David K. Levine.
- Moldoveanu, M. C. & Stevenson, H., 1998. "Ethical universals in practice: An analysis of five principles," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 721-752. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:57:y:2011:i:2:p:393-412. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mirko Janc)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.