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Asset Class Diversification and Delegation of Responsibilities between a Central Bank of Sovereign Wealth Fund

Author

Listed:
  • Joshua Aizenman

    (University of Southern California and the NBER)

  • Reuven Glick

    (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco)

Abstract

This paper presents a model comparing the degree of asset class diversification abroad by a central bank and a sovereign wealth fund. We show that if the central bank manages its foreign asset holdings in order to meet balance-of-payments needs, particularly in reducing the probability of sudden stops in foreign capital inflows, it will place a high weight on holding safer foreign assets. In contrast, if the sovereign wealth fund, acting on behalf of the Treasury, maximizes the expected utility of a representative domestic agent, it will opt for relatively greater holding of more risky foreign assets. We also show how the diversification differences between the strategies of the bank and sovereign wealth fund are affected by the government’s delegation of responsibilities and by various parameters of the economy, such as the volatility of equity returns and the total amount of public foreign assets available for management.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua Aizenman & Reuven Glick, 2014. "Asset Class Diversification and Delegation of Responsibilities between a Central Bank of Sovereign Wealth Fund," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(3), pages 129-161, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2014:q:3:a:4
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Philippe Bacchetta & Kenza Benhima & Yannick Kalantzis, 2013. "Capital Controls with International Reserve Accumulation: Can This Be Optimal?," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 229-262, July.
    2. Guillermo Calvo & Alejandro Izquierdo & Rudy Loo-Kung, 2013. "Optimal Holdings of International Reserves: Self-insurance against Sudden Stops," Monetaria, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, CEMLA, vol. 0(1), pages 1-35, January-j.
    3. Michael P. Dooley & David Folkerts-Landau & Peter M. Garber, 2005. "An essay on the revived Bretton Woods system," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Feb.
    4. Joshua Aizenman, 2008. "Large Hoarding Of International Reserves And The Emerging Global Economic Architecture," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 76(5), pages 487-503, September.
    5. Benigno, Gianluca & Fornaro, Luca, 2012. "Reserve accumulation, growth and financial crises," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 51506, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Yin‐Wong Cheung & Xingwang Qian, 2009. "Hoarding of International Reserves: Mrs Machlup's Wardrobe and the Joneses," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(4), pages 824-843, September.
    7. Olivier Jeanne & Romain Rancière, 2011. "The Optimal Level of International Reserves For Emerging Market Countries: A New Formula and Some Applications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(555), pages 905-930, September.
    8. Davide Furceri & Stéphanie Guichard & Elena Rusticelli, 2011. "Episodes of Large Capital Inflows and the Likelihood of Banking and Currency Crises and Sudden Stops," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 865, OECD Publishing.
    9. Jeffrey A. Frankel & George Saravelos, 2010. "Are Leading Indicators of Financial Crises Useful for Assessing Country Vulnerability? Evidence from the 2008-09 Global Crisis," NBER Working Papers 16047, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General

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