Discretion Rather Than Rules? When Is Discretionary Policymaking Better Than the Timeless Perspective?
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References listed on IDEAS
- Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983.
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- Paez-Farrell, Juan, 2011. "Timeless perspective versus discretionary policymaking when the degree of inflation persistence is unknown," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 2432-2438.
- Petrella, Ivan & Rossi, Raffaele & Santoro, Emiliano, 2014.
"Discretion vs. timeless perspective under model-consistent stabilization objectives,"
Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 84-88.
- Ivan Petrella & Raffaele Rossi & Emiliano Santoro, 2013. "Discretion vs. Timeless Perspective under Model-consistent Stabilization Objectives," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 1306, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
- Petrella, Ivan & Rossi, Raffaele & Santoro, Emiliano, 2013. "Discretion vs. Timeless Perspective under Model-consistent Stabilization Objectives," CEPR Discussion Papers 9731, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bask, Mikael & Proaño, Christian R., 2016. "Optimal monetary policy under learning and structural uncertainty in a New Keynesian model with a cost channel and inflation inertia," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 112-126.
- Marcelo de C. Griebeler & Ronald Otto Hillbrecht, 2014. "Convexity of the central bank's loss function and dependence between monetary instruments," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(4), pages 2275-2291.
- Sunakawa, Takeki, 2015. "A quantitative analysis of optimal sustainable monetary policies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 119-135.
- Azar HASANLI, 2016. "A New Era of Monetary Policymaking in the Light of the Post-Crisis Challenges," Turkish Economic Review, KSP Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 473-494, September.
- Paez-Farrell, Juan, 2012. "Should central bankers discount the future? A note," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 20-22.
- Bask, Mikael & Proaño, Christian R, 2012. "Optimal Monetary Policy under Learning in a New Keynesian Model with Cost Channel and Inflation Inertia," Working Paper Series 2012:7, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
More about this item
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
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