Structure, Conduct, and Performance of Principal-Agent Models: An Overview
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Keywords
; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
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